An LLM feature is not one attack surface, it is several stacked on top of each other. There is the model interface itself, where prompt injection lets an attacker override instructions or extract the system prompt. There is the application around it, where insecure output handling means model output flows into a browser, database or shell and executes. There is the retrieval layer, where a RAG pipeline can be poisoned so malicious content is pulled into trusted context. And with agents, there is the tool layer, where excessive agency means the model can be manipulated into taking real actions, sending data, calling APIs, running code, on the attacker's behalf.
OWASP formalised these in the Top 10 for LLM Applications, and prompt injection has held the top spot (LLM01) across both editions because models process instructions and data in the same channel with no clean separation. Neither RAG nor fine-tuning fully removes it, which is why regular adversarial testing, not a one-off guardrail, is the control that matters. We test the whole stack the way an attacker approaches it, then hand back proof-of-concept exploits rather than a list of theoretical risks.
The output is a report structured against the OWASP LLM Top 10, with working proof-of-concept exploits and remediation your engineers can act on, plus a retest to confirm fixes hold.
Traditional application security assumes deterministic behaviour: the same input produces the same output, and you can enumerate the paths through the code. LLMs break that assumption. Their behaviour is stochastic, they follow instructions hidden in data they were only meant to read, and they can be induced to act well outside their intended function. A scanner running known-vulnerability checks has nothing to match against, and a web-app tester who has not built an adversarial-prompt methodology will not find the injection that turns your helpful assistant into an exfiltration tool.
Guardrail products help, but they are a control to be tested, not a substitute for testing. Vendors and researchers have repeatedly shown that guardrails alone are not enough, prompt injection has been called the new SQL injection for exactly this reason. The gap is real, and it is where AI-specific testing earns its place.
AI security is not traditional app security with extra steps; it is a distinct discipline. Testing it as though it were the former is how the headline AI incidents keep happening.
The 2025 OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications risks, and how our testing addresses each. Prompt injection has ranked #1 in both editions of the list.
| OWASP ref | Risk | How we test it |
|---|---|---|
| LLM01 | Prompt injection | Direct and indirect injection, jailbreaks, system-prompt extraction against your live prompts |
| LLM02 | Sensitive information disclosure | Probing for leakage via responses, logs, embeddings and cached context |
| LLM05 | Improper output handling | Testing whether model output executes as code, SQL or script downstream |
| LLM06 | Excessive agency | Manipulating agents into misusing tools, functions and permissions |
| LLM08 | Vector & embedding weaknesses | RAG retrieval poisoning and cross-tenant data exposure in vector stores |
| +4 more | Supply chain, data poisoning, system-prompt leakage, unbounded consumption | Assessed where relevant to your architecture and scope |
Based on the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2025). Scope is tailored to your architecture; not every category applies to every system.
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